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REMO CAPONI 
University of Florence 
 
Judicial Cooperation in the European Legal Culture: Terminology and 
Conceptual Framework 
 
First of all, I would like to thank Fabrizio Cafaggi for inviting me to participate in 
the workshop on Judicial Cooperation in the Area of Fundamental Rights (EUI, 
Florence 28-29 October 2011).  
 
I. Domestic and International Litigation (and beyond) 
 
Judicial cooperation comes into consideration not only in relation to international 
disputes, but also in relation to domestic ones.  
The decision of the italian Corte di cassazione Cass. 16 ottobre 2007, n. 21748, Foro 
it., 2007, I, 3025, in re Englaro, whose reasoning refers to a big deal of foreign legal 
materials as a persuasive authority can be a good example of this. 
Nevertheless, the most challenging issues of judicial cooperation arise obviously in 
relation to international disputes.  
Therefore I will focus my attention on them.  
I will not deal with the problem to what extent the results of my remarks can be 
referred to domestic disputes. 
 
II. International Litigation: a Broad Definition 
 
A broad definition of international litigation can serve as a starting point.  
It includes cases between states, between individuals and states, and between 
individuals across borders. Cases can be brought both before domestic courts and 
international tribunal. 
 
III. Judicial Cooperation: Two Meanings, Two Worlds Apart 
 
In the european legal culture, the expression «judicial cooperation» is used with a 
plurality of meanings. I should say it better. It is used not only with a plurality of 
meanings, but also in diverse conceptual frameworks, in diverse branches of the 
laws and – consequently – it is used by diverse legal scholarships. 
Perhaps, a scholar in civil procedure can see these diversities a little bit better, 
because civil procedure goes through the great historical divide between private 
law and public law.  
There are indeed two main meanings of judicial cooperation and two main 
conceptual frameworks in which one can speak of judicial cooperation.  
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IV. First World: Judicial Cooperation as Dialogue between Judges 
 
The first meaning of judicial cooperation refers to «judicial dialogue», i.e. dialogue 
between judges, or dialogue between courts. The conceptual framework belongs to 
the constitutional law. The discussion is mainly hold by scholars in constitutional 
law. 
In this context, judicial cooperation refers to the following circumstances.  
Dealing with international litigation, both international tribunals and domestic 
courts are more and more aware of belonging to a developing «global community 
of adjudication».  
As A. M. Slaughter puts it, the focus shifts is from two systems - international and 
domestic - to one; from international and national judges to judges applying 
international law, national law, or a mix of both: «The institutional identity of all 
these courts, and the professional identity of the judges who sit on them, is shaped 
more by their common function of resolving disputes under rules of law than by 
the differences in the law they apply and the parties before them».1  
This common function leads the courts to share or exchange informations or ideas 
with each other. Judges are coming in touch with one another in many sorts of 
ways. 
 
V. Forms of Judicial Dialogue 
 
A rough distinction is to be drawn between «formal» and «informal» dialogue.  
Formal can be referred to the dialogue regulated by statutory provisions of public 
or constitutional law.  
Informal can be referred to the dialogue promoted and developed by the judges 
themselves, either: 
a) through own case law, or  
b) within the framework of private law regulation (for instance, foundig an 
Association). 
 
VI. «Formal» Dialogue (regulated by statutory provisions), e.g.: 1. 
Preliminary Reference to the ECJ; 2. Accession of the EU to the ECHR. 
 
The most powerful example of formal dialogue in Europe is the Preliminary 
Reference to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg, which is «the 
core of the legal order of the European Union».2 
                                                 
1
 A. M. Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, in 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. (2003), 191. 
2
 J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial: Judicial Ego, Int J Constitutional Law (2011) 9, p. 1-4. 
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Domestic courts adjudicating a local dispute, typically between an individual 
and a public authority, which involves a question of European Law, may, and if 
they are a court or tribunal against whose decision there is no judicial remedy, 
must, request the European Court of Justice to give a Preliminary Ruling on the 
interpretation or validity of the European Law or measure involved (art. 267 
TFEU). 
Lower courts, for the most part, have embraced the system with energy. The 
Preliminary Reference procedure gives them the power of Judicial Review over 
national law, even national constitutional law, ensuring its compliance with 
European law. 
Quite reluctant to refer for Preliminary Ruling have been up till recent times 
Member State Constitutional Courts, especially those, like the German and Italian, 
with full power of Judicial Review under their own Constitution. However, things 
are changing in recent times. The italian corte costituzionale has for the first time 
referred for Preliminary Ruling with a decision of 2008.3 The most important 
decision in this new context was issued by the German Constitutional Court in 
2010.4 According to this decision, Ultra vires review by the Federal Constitutional 
Court can only be considered if a breach of competences on the part of the 
European bodies is sufficiently qualified. This is contingent on the act of the 
authority of the European Union being manifestly in breach of competences and 
the impugned act leading to a structurally significant shift to the detriment of the 
Member States in the structure of competences. Furthermore, prior to the 
acceptance of an ultra vires act, the Court of Justice of the European Union is to be 
afforded the opportunity to interpret the Treaties, as well as to rule on the validity 
and interpretation of the acts in question, in the context of preliminary ruling 
proceedings according to Article 267 TFEU, insofar as it has not yet clarified the 
questions which have arisen. 
 
VII. «Informal» Dialogue: 1. Through private law (e.g., RPCSJUE); 2. 
Through case law (e.g., interpretation of the public policy clause, margin of 
appreciation, self restraint, deference, judicial comity, etc.) 
 
Let me speak about informal judicial dialogue.  
Firstly, I would like briefly to address the informal dialogue within the 
framework of private law regulation. Judges meet more and more frequently in a 
variety of settings, from workshops to judicial networks.  
A good example in Europe is the network of the Presidents of the Supreme 
Courts of the Member States of the European Union. They decided to found an 
                                                 
3
 Corte cost. 15 aprile 2008, n. 108, in Foro it., 2009, I, 2009.  
4
 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, 6 July 2010, in R. CAPONI, Karlsruhe europeista (appunti a prima lettura del Mangold-Beschluss 
della corte costituzionale tedesca), in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com., 2010, 1103.  
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Association with the financial support of the European Commission. The 
Constituent Assembly was held in 2004 at the French Cour de cassation.5 
Secondly, I would like to address the informal dialogue promoted and 
developed by the courts through own case law.  
As an example one can consider the public policy defence as an impediment 
to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The starting point is that 
judicial decisions are acts of state authority and produce effects only within the 
territorial boundaries of the state. State sovereignty still plays a central role. 
Jurisdiction is an aspect of state sovereignty (6). Since sovereignty is exercised over 
a particular territory, the effects of judicial decisions are limited to the state 
boundaries (7). They produce effects in the legal system of another state with the 
consent of the latter, i.e. recognition (8). Presuppositions and conditions for 
recognition are the result of an approval by the state which, in principle, does not 
face any limits in general international law. However, there are many international 
– bilateral and multilateral - treaties which provide for the mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions between contracting states. In this respect, the experience of the 
European Union is very advanced. It involves the development of a new concept 
of sovereignty which entails the inclusion of the state within the larger 
international and supranational communities. Elsewhere, there is still a great 
emphasis on the notion of sovereignty conceived in traditional terms.There is a 
lack of confidence in the courts of other states, especially in the case where the 
prevailing party is a citizen of the state where the decision has been taken, and the 
losing party is a citizen of the state where such decision is supposed to be 
recognised and enforced (9). The considerable variation between procedural 
systems of different countries, even within the western civilisation, and the 
different values that emerge from the substantive law at the global level, have 
weighed in favour of the preservation of the public policy defence (ordre public) as 
an impediment to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This 
general clause has two components: a substantive and a procedural one. It 
concerns the respect of fundamental substantive or procedural values. Once we 
leave aside the substantive law aspect, the link between public policy defence and 
fair trial/due process guarantee becomes apparent (10). If the process in the Forum 
State is sufficiently respectful of the guarantees of fair trial, there is no scope for 
the public policy defence in its procedural aspect. Alongside the substantive aspect 
of the public order defence, its procedural element should be maintained as a sort 
                                                 
5
 For further information, s. http://www.rpcsjue.org 
(
6
) F. MANN, 1964. 
(
7
) «No legal judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignity from which its authority is derived », 
so Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligne Contre Le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme , 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2001), quoted by N.  
TROCKER, 2010 [..], p. 26. 
(
8
) For a brief outline, see A. F. LOWENFELD, 2006, p. 471.  
(
9
) See N. TROCKER, 2010, p. 26.  
(
10
) The link is clearly captured in the definition of the reason for denial contained in § 328 (1), n. 4 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure (Zpo): ‘if the recognition would lead to a result that is obviously incompatible with basic principles of German law, 
especially when it is inconsistent with basic constitutional rights’, including the right to be heard in court (Art. 103 (1) Grundgesetz). 
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of «emergency brake» (11) to be activated in exceptional circumstances. This 
restrictive interpretative approach is held, in particular, by the case law of the 
European Court of Justice. It is one of the expressions of solidarity between the 
interest of the European Union for the proper functioning of the internal market 
and the individual interest of the creditor. The leading case is Krombach (12). The 
solution is balanced: the public policy is a clause set to protect the fundamental 
boundaries (13) of the national identities of the Member States inherent in their 
fundamental political and constitutional structures (14). It is therefore advisable to 
leave it initially the Member States to determine, in accordance with their own 
national concepts, the aspects of their public policy (15). However, to fully entrust 
the identification of the key elements of the national identity to the «reserved 
domain» of the Member States would mean to «inoculate the seed» for the 
dissolution of the European Union. And in fact this does not happen: the respect 
for the national identities of the Member States is part of the competences of the 
European Union (16). Hence, the role of the Court of Justice to ensure respect for 
the law in the interpretation and application of the treaties is directly called into 
play (17). The determination of the content and limits of the concept of public 
policy is then placed in a framework of mutual learning between the Court of 
Justice and the courts of the Member States. This is implemented through a 
dialogue in the search of the best solution, tailored to the specific case at hand, and 
achieved through the preliminary rulings (18). In this dialogue between judges, what 
is at stake is the respect for the essential content of the debtor’s right of defence 
(19). Who has the final word on whether the decision violates or not a fundamental 
principle of the Member State? Is it the national court called upon to identify the 
content of the notion of public policy? Or is it the Court of Justice called upon to 
identify the limits of the same notion? In a flexible way and according to each case, 
the Court of Justice is inclined to retain the competence or – after refering to «the 
                                                 
(
11
) See Ali/Unidroit Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 30: «A final judgment awarded in another forum in a 
proceeding substantially compatible with these Principles must be recognized and enforced unless substantive public policy requires 
otherwise. A provisional remedy must be recognized in the same terms». 
(
12
) ECJ, 28 march 2000, C-7/98, Krombach c. Bamberski.  
(
13
) See J.H.H. WEILER, 1999, p. 102.  
(
14
) Art. 4 (2) TEU: ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’. 
(
15
) ECJ, 28 march 2000, C-7/98, Krombach c. Bamberski, no. 22. 
(
16
) Art. 4, II TEU. 
(
17
) Art. 19, TEU. 
(
18
) ECJ, 28 march 2000, C-7/98, Krombach c. Bamberski, no. 23: «Consequently, while it is not for the Court to define the 
content of the public policy of a Contracting State, it is none the less required to review the limits within which the cour ts of a 
Contracting State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition to a judgment emanating from a court in 
another Contracting State». 
(
19
) ECJ, 28 march 2000, C-7/98, Krombach c. Bamberski, no. 37: «Recourse to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of 
the Convention can be envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another Contracting State 
would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it 
infringes a fundamental principle. In order for the prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its substance to be 
observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the 
State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order».  
See also ECJ, 2 May 2006, C-341/04, Eurofood. 
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general criteria with regard to which the national court must carry out its assessment» (20) – to 
entrust the national courts with this task.  
VIII. Two Opposite Outlooks on Judicial Dialogue: 1. Diskurstheorie 
of J. Habermas: speech acts do solve (almost) all problems; 2. N. Luhmann, 
Die Weltgesellschaft (1971): radical fragmentation of the global law, not 
along territorial, but along social sectoral lines 
 
The most influential point of view on the judicial dialogue is philosophically 
grounded on the Diskurstheorie of Jürgen Habermas21 and leads to an optimistic 
appraisal of judicial dialogue. As Aida Torres Pérez powerfully puts it, «the dialogic 
process becomes the source of legitimacy of interpretive outcomes»22. 
The results of both formal and informal dialogue is that participating judges 
see each other not only as servants and representatives of a particular polity, but 
also as fellow professionals in an endeavor that transcends national borders. They 
face common substantive and institutional problems. They learn from one 
another's experience and reasoning. They cooperate directly to resolve specific 
disputes23.  
This is true especially for the judicial cooperation between the European 
Court of justice, the European Court of Human Rights an the national 
Constitutional courts.  
As Andreas Vosskuhle puts it, the focus should be on establishing a 
European constitutional jurisdiction dedicated to developing a culture of 
cooperation and substantive coherence. Constitutional courts are called upon to 
play their part and assume «responsibility for integration» (Integrationsverantwortung) 
in a «multilevel cooperation between European constitutional courts» (europäische 
Verfassungsgerichtsverbund): «The simplistic hierarchical system of legal protection 
characterised by strict super-/subordination designed to implement an almost 
uniform structure of norms has shown itself to be unworkable. Rather, we need to 
equip the complex and uniquely intertwined multilevel system of protection of 
human rights with an adequate sharing and assigning of responsibilities. The most 
suitable «systematic concept» (Ordnungsidee) would appear to be that of multilevel 
cooperation (Verbundkonzept), since this incorporates all the factors of autonomy, 
diversity, responsiveness and the ability to act jointly»24. 
What’s the problem with the judicial cooperation? Judicial cooperation is 
performed through speech acts between lawyers, but speech acts between lawyers 
do not solve all problems. In particular they are not able to recompose the 
fragmentation of the global law. In 1971, while theorizing on the concept of world 
                                                 
20
 Così, ECJ, 2 April 2009, C-394/07, Gambazzi, no. 39. 
21
 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1992).  
22
 A. Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union. A Theory of Supranational Adjudication , Oxford, 2009. 
23
 A. M. Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, in 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. (2003), 191. 
24
 A. Vosskuhle, Protection of Human Rights in the European Union. Multilevel Cooperation on Human Rights between  the 
European Constitutional Courts, in Our Common Future, Hannover/Essen, 2-6 November 2010 (www.ourcommonfuture.de) 
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society, Luhmann put forward the «speculative hypothesis» that global law would 
experience a radical fragmentation, not along territorial, but along social sectoral 
lines (25). I think, he was right. And indeed, thirty years later, an almost explosive 
expansion of independent and globally active, yet sectorally limited, courts, quasi-
courts and other forms of conflict-resolving bodies did occur26. High expectations 
of our ability to deal adequately with legal fragmentation must be curbed since its 
origins lie not in law, but within its social contexts. 
 
 
IX. Second World: Judicial Cooperation as «International Legal 
Assistance» 
  
 
The second meaning of judicial cooperation refers to «international legal 
assistance», i.e. the cross-border cooperation between judicial and administrative 
authorities, related to the managing of (civil and criminal) proceedings, i.e., related 
to service of process, taking of evidence, recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, etc.  
The conceptual framework belongs to the procedural law.  
The discussion is mainly hold by procedural lawyers. 
In this field, traditionally there has been an overestimation of public policy 
concerns, like sovreignty concerns, overestimation which runs the risk to inbalance 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s interests27.  
As Burkhard Hess in his General Report to the XIV IAPL World Congress 
in Heidelberg (2011) puts it, international legal assistance is undergoing a period of 
transition. Concepts of sovereign procedural assistance on the basis of 
international treaties and comity have been replaced by direct communication 
between courts and judicial authorities. Therefore we can observe a trend towards 
more informal cooperation in this field too. The new concept of judicial assistance 
focuses on the needs of the parties whose procedural rights have (also) to be 
guaranteed in judicial cooperation proceedings.  
  
X. Final Remarks 
It is necessity to overcome the dualism of meanings of «Judicial cooperation» and 
to unify the discussion, identifying common trends, e.g. towards informal 
cooperation (but: Accession of the EU to the ECHR), and common problems, e.g. 
the language problem: If I only could speak italian, quante cose belle vi direi. The close 
relationship between law and language calls for the consideration of a special care 
                                                 
25
 N. LUHMANN, Die Weltgesellschaft, 57 Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie 21 (1971). 
(
26
) Così, A. FISCHER-LESCANO e G. TEUBNER, Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts, Frankfurt am 
Main, 2006. 
27
 R. Caponi, Transnational Litigation and Elements of Fair Trial, General Report, XIV World Congress of Procedural Law, 
Heidelberg, 2011.  
Preliminary Draft – English unchecked 
8 
 
in the work of translation and interpretation of legal texts especially when they 
serve judicial activity.  
Expectations have to be curb: «The center of gravity of legal development 
therefore from time immemorial has not lain in the activity of law making or in 
jurisprudence or in case law, but in society itself, and must be sought there at the 
present time» (E. Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, 1913). 
